Chapter Three: General Laws of the Rise of Great Powers
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The rise and decline of great powers, with each power replacing the next in its turn, is a common phenomenon in human history. Innumerable expert scholars and elite thinkers have conducted thorough research and contemplation of this in an attempt to find deep underlying laws, but, thus far, there is no satisfactory solution to uphold as a standard. Nevertheless, history contains to some degree an internal causal logic, and there are shared characteristics in the path and the experience of nations that have risen in the past. For late developing countries with the necessary fundamental conditions the only way to seize the opportunity and realize such a rise is to absorb the experience of early developing countries and formulate strategies appropriate to both their own conditions and those of their age.

Achieving the status of a great power most often depends on population [levels], territory [size], natural resources, geographical location, economic power, military strength, soft power, and other factors of this sort. Among these, population, territory, and natural resources are the most fundamental factors.¹ They are the material basis for determining whether a country has the potential to become a great power. But whether and to what extent that potential can be realized depends to a great extent on acquired strategies and favorable opportunities. A suitable national strategy can not only propel the rise of a great power and help it to avoid potential detours along the way, but it also has a bearing on whether a great power can hold on to its [great power] status. For example, after losing its status as the dominant global power Britain was able to hold onto its influence for several more decades. This was because they made the decision to play along with the United States rather than offering opposition. 

The more areas of superiority that a great power possesses, the greater its composite national strength will be, and the longer its age of prosperity will last. The outstanding advantages of Britain and the United States in the elements that confer superiority, such as scientific innovation and government efficiency, as well as their leadership, respectively, of the First and Second Industrial Revolutions, secured their status as unprecedented global superpowers.² But American achievements were greater and their supremacy more outstanding. Apart from the benefits of latecomer's advantage, [America’s success] is due to a historical heritage that provided population, territory, and natural resources, which allowed it to benefit from economies of scale. However, if a great power is deficient in certain aspects, [these deficiencies] can be compensated by [strength] in other aspects. For instance, Portugal, Spain, and the Netherlands had relatively small populations, but they relied on their overwhelming commercial and military superiority to become, at least for a time, dominant global powers. 

Great power status also depends on the conditions of international competition. Paul Kennedy, in his book The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, says that the rise and fall of great powers is relative, and must be considered against the global situation and in comparison to the prospects of other nations.³ In the final decade of the 20th century, the collapse of the Soviet Union, formerly a peer competitor of the United States, gave its rival the unprecedented status of sole global superpower. China during the Song dynasty was considered to be the most advanced civilization in the world, and was at the pinnacle of scientific, technological, and economic power, but it was, unfortunately, reaching that status at a time when nomadic peoples were becoming the preeminent powers. The four main rivals of the Song, namely the Tangut people of the Western Xia, the Khitan of the Great Liao, the Jurchens of the Great Jin, and the Mongolians, had powerful cavalry forces that neutralized the wealth advantage of the agrarian great power, obstructing its potential rise as the overlord of a “global order under Chinese governance.”⁴ 

Every Measurement Conforms to its Standard When Blessed By the Gifts of Nature

A poem by Qing dynasty poet Hong Liangji reads: “When blessed by all the gifts of nature, one's every measurement conforms to its standard / As perfect as the roundness of the moon.”⁵ This line about being exceptionally blessed by natural conditions refers to the superior factors and opportunities needed for success. As great powers rise, temporal, geographic, and demographic factors are all indispensable. Superior geography or demography, as well as other similar development factors, can sometimes be more important and have a more decisive influence than institutions and systems. There is no guarantee that these conditions will produce the rise of a great power; the lack of these fundamental conditions, however, necessarily precludes the possibility of the rise of a great power. When the level of science and technology [among competing powers] is similar, then geographic and demographic conditions become more important for ensuring the rise of a great power and for [that power’s ability to] persist over time.

There is Strength in Great Numbers
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After Malthus proposed his “population theory,” international society has paid close attention to the potential negative impacts of population, believing that population growth can hinder the development of poor nations. However, in recent years more and more attention is being paid to the positive impact of population growth on development. Population and territory are important preconditions for the rise of a great power. Territory means natural resources and space for development; population represents a labor force and a market. Without exception, historical empires such as Persia, Rome, Macedonia, the Han, and the Tang had large populations and vast territory. Portugal, Spain, and the Netherlands relied on extensive colonies, as well as their advantages in other areas, such as commercial capital, maritime navigation, and military power, but they quickly declined due to an insufficient population in their core territory and a lack of territory. In the industrial age, the division of labor in society became increasingly complex, with more demands made on the labor force and the market, making it difficult for countries lacking in population and territory to rise as great powers.

On the eve of the Industrial Revolution, the population of Britain was quite large. After the Industrial Revolution, Britain, having had the benefit of developing early, used the full potential of her population and natural resources. At the peak of its prosperity, Britain, which possessed only 2% of the global population, held more than 30% of global GDP, accounted for a fifth of global trade, and held two-fifths of manufacturing trade volume. However, as other Western countries successively industrialized, the limitations of Britain’s limited population and natural resources became apparent. British politician Leo Amery asked, “How can these little islands hold their own in the long run against such great and rich empires as the United States and Germany are rapidly becoming? How can we, with forty million people, compete with states nearly double our size?”⁶

The population of the United States was far greater in scale than that of England, France, Germany, and Japan, its territory was many times larger, and its prospects for population growth outstripped those of other developed nations. To a certain extent, if we say that the industrialization of Britain, Germany, France, and Japan were each driven by a single motor, the eastern, central, and western regions of the United States, with their population and land area, are equivalent to two, three, or more motors. Consequently, the time needed by the United States to complete full industrialization was longer, its economic prosperity of a longer duration, and its position as a great power and hegemonic power unprecedented. As Zbigniew Brzezinski says in The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, America is “the sole and, indeed, the first truly global power.”⁷

As the saying goes, “a small boat is easy to maneuver.” Japan, with its relatively low population, as well as minimal political and cultural resistance, was able to rapidly embark on industrialization after the Meiji Restoration. As a result of the advantages of early development, and using indemnities paid after the First Sino-Japanese War, international financing, and a technological crowding-out effect, Japan completed industrialization in a relatively short span of time and progressed to the ranks of developed nations. Much like Britain, Japan pulled off a miracle despite its small-scale population and territory and rose to become the second-largest economy in the world. But population and territory limited their space for growth, and as labor power, markets, and technology reached their limits, growth based on Japan's export-oriented economy was gradually exhausted, and after the 1990s it fell into a prolonged depression.

Population and territorial superiority allowed China to become the only one of the four great ancient civilizations to have continued to the present, and provided it with “a threshold for accommodation and an ability to absorb.” L. S. Stavrianos said that “being too large and cohesive to be conquered outright like India and the other countries of Southeast Asia, China was never to succumb entirely [to the Western challenge].”⁸ But it was precisely China’s massive population and deep-rooted traditional culture that provided great resistance to and delayed the beginning of the country’s early industrialization, which experienced numerous failed attempts and defeats. At the beginning of Reform and Opening, the population once again became a burden, and a certain amount of family planning policy was required to free China from the “poverty trap.” After the country's economic takeoff, the massive “demographic dividend” was considered a major factor in the Chinese miracle. At present, the “demographic dividend” has expired, but educational level and per-capita income will provide an unprecedented “talent dividend” and “market dividend.” Once a population of 1.3 billion people has grown wealthy, the result will be a supersized marketplace.

India’s massive population and expansive territory gave its civilization an important position in the ancient world, but these [factors] also became a burden at the beginning of industrialization. In early 2020, the Indian economy surpassed those of England and France, becoming the fifth-largest in the world. Goldman Sachs projects that India will have the third-largest economy in the world by 2040.⁹ As countries in Europe and East Asia face increasingly grave issues with aging and shrinking populations, India’s population numbers and [age] composition present massive advantages and potential. They can rely on “a continued abundance in their youth cohort.” [As] the American scholar [Fareed] Zakaria says: “If demography is destiny then India is secure.”¹⁰

Neighbors Are Dearer Than Distant Relatives^11
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Considering the economic achievements of China after Reform and Opening, University of Wisconsin-Madison professor Edward Friedman said that one of the important factors was that China was “located in East Asia and not East Africa.”¹² Here he is emphasizing the importance of the environment on China’s periphery to China's rise. After Reform and Opening, China [joined] a trend of postwar development in East Asia. To a certain extent China’s economic achievements are due to the collective rise of the region—beginning with Japan's modernization and the accomplishment of postwar industrialization, spreading to the Four Asian Tigers, and then turning into an industrialization wave that reached China's shores and gradually spread inland.

There is usually a fair deal of friction between neighboring countries, but at the level of civilizational and economic development, it is often the case that “neighbors are dearer than distant relatives.” Historically, the great majority of ancient and powerful states were concentrated on the Eurasian Continent, and they tended to rise and fall in sequence and as groups. After the Industrial Revolution, the main developed countries were found in Europe and North America. Looking at the rise and fall of many great powers, we see the cluster effect and peripheral diffusion effect quite strongly in economic development and civilizational progress. This is seen even more clearly in the collective rise of East Asia, or the arrival of what is called the “Asia-Pacific century.” The course of China’s Belt and Road Initiative provides further evidence [for this fact].

The “takeoff” of Europe was also a collective process. The rise of Venice and other Italian city-states, Portugal, Spain, and Holland provided an economic core and a stable foundation for the collective rise of Europe. The British economy rose on a foundation of trade with countries on the coast of the Atlantic. It was part of an Atlantic economy. After the Industrial Revolution, British capital leaped beyond the English Channel and spread to France and other Western European regions. In the same time period, modern manufacturing made landfall in North America; to a certain extent, the economy of the United States represents an inheritance and continuation of the British economy. Europe provided funding, labor, technology, and a market for the United States. In the late 19th century, the backward countries of Europe caught up with advanced countries in Europe and North America without interruption, and the Atlantic economies experienced a collective takeoff.

After the midpoint of the 20th century, Japan was the destination for much of the manufacturing capacity transferred out of the United States, and it entered a period of high-speed growth. At the end of the 20th century, China became another “factory of the world.” In the 1950s and 1960s, New China received the support of the Soviet Union to build enterprises and facilities, building a foundation for the later “takeoff.” Reform and Opening at the end of the 1970s can be seen as another stop on the westward march of industrialization. “The meeting of the westward and eastward advances of industrialization created the ‘Chinese miracle.’”

Over the previous five centuries, there have been three structural power shifts, as well as the successive rise of great powers and their [respective] regional communities. The first power shift came with the rise of Europe. The second power shift was the rise of America and its allies. Currently, the international community, following a “flying geese paradigm,” with the Asia-Pacific region at the head of a “V” formation, is undergoing a third modern power shift. As the Belt and Road Initiative gathers momentum, people expect to see the collective rise of the Belt and Road countries. In The Silk Roads: A New History of the World, Peter Frankopan writes: “The world is spinning on its axis back to where it began a thousand years before on the Silk Road.”¹³

Craft a High-Quality Friend Circle
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Looking back over the last five centuries at the temporal and spatial sequence with which great powers rose, late developing great powers were either neighbors of great powers that rose before them, or they were the "distant relatives" or friends, namely states with which they had a close relationship based on shared cultural, political, or other relationship–for example, the relationship between a tributary state and the suzerain, or between states in an alliance. Social and political proximity has a major impact on trade and investment; similar cultural environments make it easier to pass knowledge and technology. In The European Miracle: Environments, Economies and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia, Eric Jones takes the rise of Europe’s overseas dependencies as proof that [shared] elements, such as culture and political systems, can to a great extent make up for the geographical distance. The examples of this include America, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and even South Africa, which all realized industrialization. It was because of large differences between their culture and political systems that the [wildfire of] European industrialization “abruptly died” at “the asbestos edge of the Muslim sphere.”¹⁴

Japan has submitted to Western civilization; apart from Japan's own “abandon Asia, learn from Europe” strategy,¹⁵ the great strategic importance attached to the country and the support extended to them by the United States had a major role in the rise of Japan. After the country was opened up by the United States Japan became an American export market and shipping depot. After that Japan became an increasingly important element of America’s international strategy. Following the Second World War, Japan started to receive support from America to counterbalance Eastern powers; economic aid, direct investment, and favored access to American markets were the most important external causes of Japan's rapid development.

During the period when Western powers took the dominant position in economics, science, and technology, estrangement or even antagonism caused many countries to lose timely opportunities for development. Argentina's missed opportunities to achieve economic success are considered to be related to its unwise diplomatic alliances. As Dambisa Moyo points out in Edge of Chaos: Why Democracy Is Failing to Deliver Economic Growth—and How to Fix It: “Among the biggest policy errors occurred when Argentina failed in 1944 to align itself with the United States, which was beginning its economic ascendancy. Instead, its leaders chose to align with Britain, just then commencing its economic decline.”¹⁶ After the Second World War, countries in Eastern Europe and elsewhere joined the Soviet camp, pursuing Soviet-style industrialization, and thereby distancing themselves from the center of global markets and core technologies.

The State that Esteems Industry will Increase in Wisdom Day by Day¹⁷

Economic growth is a prerequisite to and a necessary foundation for the rise of a great power; this is one of the greatest challenges faced by great powers in maintaining their status. Paul Kennedy, in his book The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, emphasizes that the rise and fall of a great power comes down most decisively to relative economic power over other nations. In the era of agricultural economies, the great powers of the world were usually those with a high degree of agricultural development. After the Age of Discovery, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, and other countries with limited population and territory rose in succession, relying on commercial and military power that had no previous precedents. After the arrival of industrial society, a timely realization of industrialization became a precondition for the rise of great powers. For a modern economy to be prosperous and strong it requires a powerful, diversified, and creative manufacturing industry.

Manufacturing can Rejuvenate a Nation
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The manufacturing industry is the source of technological innovation and the force behind economic growth. In comparison to pre-industrial society, the Industrial Revolution produced astonishing increases in productivity. From the first year of the common era to 1400 the annual growth of the global economy was on average only 0.05%. In contrast, in the Netherlands during the 17th century, post-Industrial Revolution Britain, the United States during the 19th century, and the East Asian economies during the second half of the 20th century had average respective growth rates of 0.5%, 2%, 4%, and 8-10%, respectively. Before the 15th century, it took 1400 years for the global economy to double in size, but it took the East Asian economies only seven or eight years to pull off the same feat in the 20th century.

By the end of the 18th century, Britain had already established the foundations for industrialization, not only in the form of artisans’ workshops but also a highly-regarded shipbuilding industry, and its pig iron production accounting for around 15% of world output. By 1870, Britain possessed a third of the world's manufacturing output.

Owing to its unparalleled natural endowments and immigration and investment from Europe, the American economy was quite large from its founding. After the Civil War, the United States rapidly carried out the process of industrialization. In 1870, the United States accounted for less than a quarter of the world's manufacturing capacity, but that rose to around 36% by the 1880s. In the century that followed, America held onto its hegemony over global manufacturing.

Germany’s takeoff came in the final three decades of the 19th century when it completed the transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy. On the foundation of coal, iron, and other traditional pillar industries, the chemical and electrical industries also quickly developed; Germany became a global leader in the chemical industry, producing half of the world's synthetic fuel. Despite the distorted development of military industrialization under Hitler and the postwar division of the country, Germany recovered its status as a major manufacturing power and a major trading power following the reunification of the country in 1990.

Changes in the proportion of global manufacturing held by individual powers are reflected in shifts in the patterns of development of great powers. In 1750, China produced a third of global finished goods, putting it in first place ahead of India. Around 1860, Britain overtook China; America captured the top spot in 1900, followed by England and Germany in second and third place, respectively. In 1953, the system had shifted so that the manufacturing industry was captured [entirely] by the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain. However, America still [had a commanding lead], outstripping Soviet production by four times or more. In 1980, the United States and the Soviet Union were still out ahead, but Japan overtook Britain for third place.

Becoming a major manufacturing power provides crucial security for the goal of realizing the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation. At the founding of New China, the country was fundamentally a grindingly poor and backward agricultural nation.¹⁸ China has now become the foremost industrial power in the world. The modern industrial system of China is the most comprehensive, encompassing forty-one major industrial categories, and producing over two hundred of the top five hundred industrial products in the world. In 2010, China surpassed the United States in manufacturing value-added, and by 2018, the Chinese manufacturing industry commanded 28% of global output. The fundamental national conditions produced by becoming a major industrial power support the realization of the Two Centenary Goals.¹⁹ At the gathering to celebrate the 40th anniversary of Reform and Opening, General Secretary Xi Jinping stated that becoming the foremost manufacturing power was necessary for “the Chinese people to take a decisive step on their journey towards wealth and strength.”²⁰

Conforming to the Laws of Industrialization
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In the modern sense, economic development usually means a transition from agriculture to low-tech industry, then on to high-tech industries and service industries. Each country's path to industrialization is not identical, but they conform to a similar law of industrial progress, usually developing industry in a sequence that begins with food, moves next to textiles, then machinery, chemicals, electronics, and so on, developing around these focal points in turn. As primary, secondary, and tertiary industries evolve successively to take the main position in social production, the dominant industry also upgrades gradually from labor-intensive to capital- and technology-intensive. In the industrialization of developed nations, light industry usually develops first, followed by heavy industry.

Many late developing countries became impatient for results, rearranged this development sequence, and wandered off the path [of industrialized development]. After the October Revolution, the Soviet Union continued its process of industrialization under a planned economy. In the first Five-Year Plan, issued in 1929, the emphasis was on developing coal, iron and steel, and other industries, mobilizing the natural resources of the entire country toward heavy industrialization. Although Soviet industrialization achieved some degree of success, there were imbalances owing to the fact that forceful government intervention was excessively focused on heavy industry. After its founding, New China mimicked the Soviet Union's planned economy and emphasis on heavy industry. In the 1950s, the process of industrialization was delayed by the arrival of the Great Leap Forward, which destroyed China’s agricultural foundation.²¹ Industrialization began with heavy industry, but due to distortions in the process of distributing the essential factors of production and excessive political interference, it was hard to sustain.

However, for newly industrializing countries, following the law of industrial development–in which light industry follows heavy industry and there is progressive step-by-step development–has proven a crucial element of success. At the beginning of the 1980s, China also gave up on the strategy of prioritizing heavy industry, allowing light industry to develop rapidly. In the 1990s, the Chinese electronic information industry was one of the fastest growing industrial sectors. From the end of the 1990s, China entered a stage of heavy industrialization, with heavy industry outstripping the expansion of light industry.

Integrating With the International Industrial Chain
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One important prerequisite for the industrialization of late-developing countries is successfully taking on labor-intensive industries for international markets. Based on its natural resources, close cultural ties, and convenient maritime links with Europe, and especially its powerful economic momentum, the United States became in the second half of the 19th century the largest beneficiary of the overseas transfer of manufacturing from Britain. In 1914, the United States ranked first place globally in terms of the scale of capital input, with British bond investment accounting for 85.9% of foreign investment. After this international transfer of industry, America gradually became the new “factory of the world.”

After the United States established itself as the global economic, industrial, and technological leader, it undertook a program of industrial restructuring, which saw the manufacture of iron and steel, textiles, chemicals, ships, common industrial machinery, and other similar products move overseas. Although they had a lower level of development, relatively good foundations for development and strategic relationships with the United States meant that Japan and West Germany became the destination for American manufacturing. They quickly became top global suppliers of labor-intensive manufactured goods. Consequently, the pace of industrialization in these two countries increased with tremendous speed, and their composite national strength rapidly grew. Japan became yet another “factory of the world,” and West Germany became a major economic power.

In the 1970s, it was Japan's outbound transfer of the labor-intensive textile and other light industries, as well as capital-intensive industries, like iron and steel, chemicals, and shipbuilding that created the economic miracle of the Four Asian Tigers. The scope of the economic systems of the Four Asian Tigers was small, however, and the pace of industrial upgrading was rapid, which meant th fat taking up high-tech manufacturing from Japan required them, too, to start moving labor-intensive industries overseas. It was at this time that China, vigorously pursuing Reform and Opening, and with the advantage of low costs and geographic advantages, became the main destination for labor-intensive industry transfers from the Four Asian Tigers. Through actively promoting the domestic market economy, actively calling for foreign investment, and taking advantage of a relatively good industrial foundation, China's industrialization process experienced a remarkable acceleration; China became another “factory of the world.”

The aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis set off a new round of global industrial transfers. China became a major exporting country and also a recipient; excepting central and western regions in China, much of the industrial transfer was directed toward countries along the Belt and Road. There is hope that the Belt and Road countries might synchronize with Asia, which has high rates of economic and trade growth. Estimates hold that the average annual GDP growth rate of the Belt and Road countries will be significantly higher than the global average, opening up the hopeful possibility of a new global economic growth area. 

Take the Initiative in Innovation

Scientific and technological innovation is a key force for economic growth, and it serves as a crucial indicator of the actual strength of a great power. Prior to the 1950s, the contribution of scientific and technological progress to the economies of developed countries was 20-40%, rising to 60-80% in the 1960s. Between 2001 and 2009, the value added for high tech industries in the manufacturing sector in the United States went from 17% to 21.3%.²² For late developing countries, copying and assimilating advanced technologies from developed countries is key to their rise as a nation, but becoming the dominant global power requires the assistance of revolutionary scientific and technological innovations, as occurred in the United States and Britain following their respective scientific and technological revolutions.

Science and Technology Sustain the Rise of Nations
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Economic development ultimately relies on obtaining and mastering advanced science and technology. Putting science and technology to use has become increasingly important since the Age of Discovery. As Adam Smith pointed out, the division of labor and the expansion of markets stimulate technological innovation; the wealth of nations is increased through greater labor productivity [produced by the division of labor and technology]. Robert Solow, winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, holds the belief that, in the long-term, the only source of economic growth is industrial progress.²³ Seven-eighths of the growth in the per capita GDP of the United States during the first half of the 20th century can be attributed to technological progress.

Geographical power shifts among great powers often follow shifts among the centers of scientific and technological development. The well-known American historian William H. McNeill believes that the Islamic world was far more scientifically and technologically advanced between 750 and 1100 AD than Europe.²⁴ After the year 1000, China became the global leader in science and technology. By the 15th century, the global center of science and technology began to shift to the Mediterranean region and Europe. Although the entire population of Portugal was equal only to that of Nanjing, that country's maritime fleet had military coercive power that far exceeded Zheng He's armada. After the Age of Discovery, the West rose, and Italy, Britain, France, Germany, America, and other nations successively became global techno-scientific centers.²⁵

In the middle 16th century, a number of important thinkers in natural philosophy emerged in the city-states of Italy, transforming them into centers of scientific activity. Through the 16th and 17th centuries a number of thinkers in Britain burst forth, including William Gilbert, Robert Boyle, Isaac Newton, Edmond Halley, and others, who initiated a number of modern scientific disciplines, including physics, chemistry, and physiology. From the mid-18th to mid-19th centuries, France produced a great number of scientific thinkers, including Jean le Rond d'Alembert and Pierre Simon Marquis de Laplace, who made outstanding contributions in a number of fields, including thermodynamics, chemistry, and celestial mechanics, which would provide the theoretical foundation for the internal combustion revolution and the chemical revolution. From the 1820s forward German science advanced by leaps and bounds. Germany became the world leader in disciplines such as organic chemistry and particle physics. In the 1920s, the United States, taking advantage of the revolution in information technology, replaced Germany as the global scientific center, and took a position at the front line of scientific progress. 

At present, the major global science and technology centers are concentrated in the developed nations of Europe and North America, but trends show a shift toward the Asia-Pacific region. Japanese scientific and technological power remains impressive, but developing economies are claiming a greater proportion of research and development, which has led to an enhanced capacity for technological innovation. Pan Jiaofeng, President of the Institutes of Science and Development of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, is among those who have pointed out that a new round of techno-scientific revolution and industrial transformation is currently being fermented, which will provide China with the opportunity to become the center of global science and technology and the world leader in techno-scientific development.²⁶

Lead in High Technology Industries
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Economically successful nations generally place a high degree of emphasis on scientific and technological innovation. [For example,] when 18th century Britain became a technological leader it rapidly became a powerful European, Continental, and world power. In 2012, the United States, Japan, and Germany accounted, respectively, for 26.44, 22.35, and 9.61% of patent applications under the Patent Cooperation Treaty. Scientific and technological development emerges from a wide range of industrial practices and commercial drivers. Wen Yi, a professor at Tsinghua University, believes that “So long as a nation steps out onto the road of Industrial Revolution and becomes the factory of the world, it has the possibility of becoming the world leader in technological innovation. But if an industrialized nation abandons its manufacturing industry, it will very likely come by degrees to lose its technological advantage and capacity for innovation.”²⁷

American science and technology has always been considered formidable and is renowned as among the best in the world. Many of the most important inventions in human history, including the incandescent bulb, the cotton gin, universal machine parts, and the production line came from the United States. Vaclav Smil writes in his Made in the USA: The Rise and Retreat of American Manufacturing: “[America's] enormous post-1865 leap was primarily driven by technical advances. These developments made the United States not only the largest mass producer of goods but also the leader in commercializing new inventions, setting up entirely new industries, introducing new ways of production, and raising labor productivity. More than a century later the country, and the world, still continue to benefit from many of those epoch-making advances.”²⁸

Presently, the United States faces many problems in economic growth, but it is still the preeminent global power in science and technology. In informatization, aerospace, artificial intelligence, medicine, military technology, and other high-tech industries, the United States has overwhelming technical superiority. American research and development expenditures are the highest in the world, and the country has a strong foundation in basic scientific research and abundant resources in scientific and technical manpower. Between 1901 and 2019, a total of 613 scientists received the Nobel Prize, among which 287 were American citizens. Americans have a near monopoly on the Turing Award in computer science, and the country is home to 59% of researchers in artificial intelligence. The United States also claims forty of the world's top hundred universities, as well as the majority of the top technology companies.

Drawing on the capital, expertise, and equipment of early developing countries is the main way that late developing countries can rapidly close the technology gap. In 1789, when Briton Samuel Slater went to the United States and built from memory his own version of Richard Arkwright's spinning jenny, his machine kicked off the beginning of modern American industrialization.²⁹ In the middle 19th century, German and American railways were only opened by importing British equipment and capital. In the early years of the Soviet Union, Lenin's New Economic Policy leased certain enterprises to management from America, Japan, and other countries. During the first Five-Year Plan, Stalin engaged experts from America, Germany, and other countries as advisers on key enterprises. After the Second World War, Japan imported advanced technology from Britain and America; they would sometimes go so far as to dismantle Western products in order to reverse engineer the designs. In the manufacture of some products, like automobiles, optical equipment, precision instruments, and precision machine tools, Japan's style of imitation led to great success.

For long periods of time, China was the global leader in science and technology, but it has missed out on the techno-scientific revolutions of the past five hundred years. New China is an example of a country catching up from behind in science and technology, with the country making outstanding achievements in high-tech fields, with the Two Bombs, One Satellite project as one example.³⁰ In recent years, China has pulled off quantum leaps in numerous fields, including digital information technology, 5G, and artificial intelligence, accelerating its progress into the ranks of the global leaders in science and technology. Among patents approved globally in 2017, China claimed 30%, with the United States taking 23%, Japan 14%, South Korea 9%, and Europe 8%. Beginning in 2007, China began to award more doctorates in the natural sciences and engineering each year than the United States does.

China still has a not insignificant gap to close with the United States in the fields of science and technology, but the [Chinese] growth rate is rapid and there is potential for development. Between 2000 and 2017, China's research and development expenditures grew at an average of 17.3%, easily beating the American rate of 4.3%. In their book Created in China: How China is Becoming a Global Innovator, Georges Haour and Max von Zedtwitz point out: "China’s pragmatic and entrepreneurial spirit, massive investment in R&D, compounded by its Confucian tradition and the extensive use of the Internet by its urban population, means that the country is about to become a major country for innovation.”³¹

Rough Seas Reveal the Strength of the Mast³²

Since the 1980s, the ideas of neoliberalism and the Washington Consensus have been widely disseminated, and developed countries demanded that developing nations adopt what are termed “good policies” and “good institutions” in the interests of economic development. But in actual practice, these sorts of policies and institutions [can only be] the result of industrialization. For late developing countries in the process of rising as a great power, a stable government and good social order play a larger role in the process of industrialization than “Western-style democracy.” Many of those countries that blindly accepted the Washington Consensus did not merely fail to grow their economies but sank into political turmoil.

Strong and Effective Government
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In Political Order in Changing Societies, Samuel Huntington points out that in third world countries, the process of modernization, economic development, and socio-cultural transformation take priority.³³ Political modernization is only possible with their realization. Those countries that attempt to jump forward to a modern Western system in a short period of time  ignore the reality that political modernization is a gradual process. They inevitably discover that attempting to accelerate the process paradoxically leads to delays. The transition from tradition to modernity requires a strong government, namely a government with the ability to balance political participation against political institutionalization. “In terms of observable behavior, the crucial distinction between a politically developed society and an underdeveloped one is the number, size, and effectiveness of its organizations.”

In The Mystery of Economic Growth, Elhanan Helpman says that a powerful political system supports national development and economic growth, and that longer-lasting regimes are better for the creation of policy that accelerates growth.³⁴ In developing countries, a lack of reliable government administration, law enforcement, and justice usually leads to terrible economic outcomes. As Dambisa Moyo notes in Edge of Chaos: “In 2014, violence cost the global economy US $14.3 trillion—or 13.4 percent of world GDP.”³⁵ One of the key reasons given for Argentina's "steep decline" since the 1930s is that “over a fifty-year period, between 1930 and the mid-1970s, Argentina had six military coups.”

As well as promoting economic growth, stable governments are more likely to make long-term investments in things like public services and infrastructure. Zakaria points out that the stories of development in Japan, the United States, Europe, and China share a single thread, which is strong and reliable political institutions. “The Chinese government enjoys a high rate of popular support,” Zakaria writes, “which helps make it possible to carry out designated strategies.”³⁶ He notes the comments of a senior Indian government official: “We have to do many things that are politically popular but are foolish. They depress our long-term economic potential. But politicians need votes in the short term. China can take the long view. And while it doesn't do everything right, it makes many decisions that are smart and far-sighted.”

An Open and Inclusive Strategy for Foreign Relations 
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Since at present globalization is still far from complete, and national boundaries and geography remain boundaries to the flow of key elements [of the economy], openness is crucial for the economic growth of late developing countries. There is a positive correlation between economic growth and many indexes of openness to trade; there is a negative correlation between disruptions of free trade and economic growth; and countries open to trade tend to grow at twice the rate of countries that adopt a closed-door policy. In Whither the World: The Political Economy of the Future, Grzegorz Kołodko points out that closed economies are not able to grow quickly over the long term.³⁷ Looking at the rise and fall of great powers gives us ample proof that "tolerance" is an essential condition for the rise of great powers, and "isolation" inevitably leads to decline.

Reform and Opening has been the magic formula in China's modernization drive. In General Secretary Xi Jinping's report at 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, he spoke about “promoting a new [development] pattern of opening-up on all fronts”; he emphasized that “openness brings progress, while self-seclusion leaves one lagging behind,” and “China will not close its doors to the world but will only open them wider”; and he concluded that “China adheres to the fundamental national policy of opening up and pursues development with its doors open wider.”³⁸ At a November, 12th, 2020 celebration of the 30th anniversary of Pudong's development and opening-up, General Secretary Xi Jinping went a step further, calling for the need to promote high quality institutional opening up, to further open up the door to the country, so that every nation might partake of the opportunities provided by China's development, and to actively participate in global economic governance.³⁹

The United States was once a country with a high degree of openness. From the westward march of technology to explosive industrial development, and then in its victory in the Second World War, immigrants have contributed to the advancement and success of the United States. America's victory in the race to the development of the atomic bomb is inseparable from the fact that it was able to attract immigrant scientists from Europe. At the dawn of the computer age, the United States gained its position as the [world’s] technological and economic leader through this same ability to attract talent from around the world. Silicon Valley produced one of the greatest explosions of wealth in human history, and the creativity of immigrants was crucial to that story, too.

But Yale professor Amy Chua says that the United States is “losing this excellent quality, and its dominance faces an unprecedented threat.”⁴⁰ Zakaria claims: American politics is now beyond cure, mired in factional struggle, and increasingly inefficient.⁴¹ With Trump's victory came the popularity of the slogan "America first"; this meant vigorous trade protectionism and active restrictions on immigration. The reversal of the open-door policy is another step down the road to America losing its status as a great power.

Build a Strong Leadership Core⁴²
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Leaders in the development of history can play important functions, directly affecting the trajectory and velocity of a rising great power. Engels pointed out that authority is a universal phenomenon in human behavior.⁴³ The "cobweb model" of political science proves that even the most complex web has a core.⁴⁴ Huntington believes that modernization requires authority with a transformative capacity, and authority must be concentrated in the hands of certain powerful individuals or groups.⁴⁵

Leaders can play a key role at turning points in history. Behind the rise of many great powers were important individuals and leaders who were capable of transforming the fate of the nation. Liu Xinru of the theory department of People's Liberation Army Daily argues that a strong leadership core is a crucial element for the rise of a great power.⁴⁶ This is particularly true in critical periods when a strong leadership core and a leader capable of making history is indispensable. 

After Portugal and Spain emerged from feudal division and became unified nation-states, there emerged strong central governments and monarchical powers. Portugal sponsored seafarers to explore new territory in the name of the state, and voyages of discovery became a planned and organized national strategy. Prince Henry [the Navigator] created the first state-run school for maritime navigation in human history and built a world-class armada. After Spain became a unified nation-state, Queen Isabella planned ambitious maritime expeditions and even sold her jewels to fund Columbus's expedition.

Britain built the most powerful navy in Europe with the support of Queen Elizabeth. King Louis XIV of France established absolute monarchical power, transforming the country from a disunited feudal aristocracy into a great and powerful nation. Bismarck, the “Iron Chancellor” of Germany, implemented social reforms, propelling Germany's composite national strength to become the strongest in continental Europe. Peter the First, Tsar of Russia, initiated an epoch-making modernization movement for which he is remembered as the "greatest ruler" in Russian history. In the Meiji Restoration, Japan abrogated the authority of a hereditary aristocracy, reinforced central authority, and forced through political, economic, and social reforms. Japan’s rise to great power status was the final result [of these centralizing reforms].

George Washington, the first president of the United States, had an important role in many aspects of the establishment and founding of the country. In 1787 he presided over the Constitutional Convention that gave the country the basic law that is still in use today, and established the authority of the president as the head of state.Thomas Jefferson, the founder of the Democratic Party, drafted the Declaration of Independence, and through diplomatic and other methods nearly doubled the territory of the United States. Abraham Lincoln won victory in the Civil War and issued the Emancipation Proclamation, preserving the integrity of the federation. Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal saved the United States from the abyss of economic crisis, allowing it to win the Second World War and become a superpower.

Historically, countries without a strong leadership core often fall into the "Bismarck trap."⁴⁷ After the Franco-Prussian War, Bismarck, attempting to isolate and weaken France, advocated France adopt a multi-party republican system, believing that an unstable republican system would turn France into an unstable volcano. Between 1875 and 1940, France was ruled by 102 separate administrations, each lasting an average of five months, with two lasting a single day. The Soviet Union collapsed for a complex set of reasons, but one of the most important was the loss of authority by the ruling party.⁴⁸

“Among majestic mountains, the great peak stands out.” Establishing a strong leadership core for the Party was one of the great lessons of revolutionary victory. “Without Mao Zedong,” Deng Xiaoping proclaimed with great emotion, “the Chinese people would have been forced to grope in the dark for much longer.”⁴⁹ The historic achievements made by the Party and the country since the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party are fundamentally linked to the ability of the o, with Xi Jinping as its core, to steer the ship of state. At a crucial moment for the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation, General Secretary Xi Jinping demonstrated a self-confident political will, and made farsighted strategic decisions, showing his willingness to take on the role of “the guiding spirit” and the “strong mast in rough seas.”

Bibliography

_{1. [UK] Paul Kennedy, translated by Wang Baozun et al. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000. Published by CITIC Press in 2013.}

_{2. [US] Samuel P. Huntington, translated by Wang Guanhua et al. Political Order in Changing Societies. Published by Lifelong·Reader·New Knowledge Joint Publishing Co., Ltd. in 1989.}

_{3. [US] Jared Diamond, translated by Luan Qi. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. Published by CITIC Press in 2017.}

_{4. [US] Zbigniew Brzezinski, translated by China Institute of International Studies. The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives. Published by Shanghai People's Publishing House in 1998.}

_{5. [US] L. S. Stavrianos, translated by Wu Xiangying, Liang Chimin, Dong Shuhui, Wang Chang. A Global History: From Prehistory to the 21st Century. Published by Peking University Press in 2006.}

_{6. [US] Fareed Zakaria, translated by Zhao Guangcheng, Lin Minwang. The Post-American World: The Rise of the Rest. Published by CITIC Press in 2009.}

_{7. [US] Amy Chua, translated by Liu Haiqing, Yang Liwu. Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance - and Why They Fall. Published by New World Press in 2010.}

_{8. [US] Tonio Andrade, translated by Zhang Xiaoduo. The Gunpowder Age: China, Military Innovation, and the Rise of the West in World History. Published by CITIC Press in 2019.}

_{9. [US] Dambisa Moyo, translated by Wang Yuqing. Edge of Chaos: Why Democracy Is Failing to Deliver Economic Growth—and How to Fix It. Published by CITIC Press in 2019.}

_{10. [US] Vaclav Smil, translated by Li Fenghai, Liu Yinlong. Made in the USA: The Rise and Retreat of American Manufacturing. Published by China Machine Press in 2014.}

_{11. [US] William H. McNeill, translated by Sun Yue, Chen Zhijian, Yu Zhan. The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community. Published by CITIC Press in 2018.}

_{12. [UK] Eric Jones, translated by Chen Xiaobai. The European Miracle: Environments, Economies and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia. Published by Huaxia Publishing House in 2015.}

_{13. [UK] Zhang Xiazhun, translated by Yan Rong. The Hypocrisy of Wealth: The Myth of Free Trade and the Hidden History of Capitalism. Published by Social Sciences Academic Press in 2009.}

_{14. [Poland] Grzegorz W. Kolodko, translated by Long Yun'an. Whither the World: The Political Economy of the Future. Published by Central Compilation and Translation Press in 2015.}

_{15. [Japan] Kenichi Ohmae, translated by Zhu Yuewei. A Society of Stagnation: How Protectionism and the Anti-Globalization Crisis Can Be Addressed. Published by Beijing Times-Huawen Publishing House in 2019.}

_{16. Zhang Fan. Industrial Shift: The Geographical Migration of World Manufacturing and Central Markets. Published by Peking University Press in 2019.}

_{17. Wen Yi. The Great Industrial Revolution in China: A Critique of the General Principles of 'Developmental Political Economy.' Published by Tsinghua University Press in 2016.}

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1. See glossary for COMPOSITE NATIONAL STRENGTH.

2. Historians often divide the industrial revolution into two waves of innovation: the First Industrial Revolution, which saw the application of steam power to mechanized work, occurred roughly between the late 18th century and the mid-19th century, beginning in Britain. The Second Industrial Revolution occurred roughly between the mid-19th century and early 20th century. It was marked by further advancements in technology, particularly in the areas of steel production, electrification, fossil fuel use, and chemical manufacturing. This period also saw the rise of large-scale industrial corporations and the expansion of industrialization to other countries beyond Britain, notably the United States and Germany.

3. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987). 

4. The Xia, Liao, and Jin were all founded by non-Han ethnic groups that rose to power on China's periphery contemporaneously with the Song Dynasty. The Western Xia (1038-1227 AD) was located in what is today the the northwest of China. The Liao Dynasty (907 to 1125 AD) controlled a vast territory in present-day Northeast China, Mongolia, and portions of Russia. The Jin Dynasty (1115 to 1234 AD) conquered the Liao Dynasty in 1125 and then ended the Northern Song period in 1127,  establishing control over all of northern China. The Mongols conquered the remainder of the Song Dynasty in 1279, marking the end of the Southern Song period and the beginning of the Yuan Dynasty in China.

These comments on the Song Dynasty's relative lack of military power passage despite its economic brilliance appear to closely parallel a passage from Tonio Andrade’s The Gunpowder Age: China, Military Innovation, and the Rise of the West in World History. To quote:

Recent work on Song history shows that the Song didn’t neglect war nearly as much as this argument would suggest… So how do we resolve the puzzle of the Song’s inability to prevail? The answer has less to do with the weakness of the Song than with the strength of its enemies. Over its 319 years, the Song faced four primary foes. The most famous (and deadly) was the Mongol Empire, which didn’t just overpower the Song: its conquests stretched from Kiev to Baghdad, Kabul to Kaifeng. Before the Mongols, the Song faced other implacable enemies from Central and Northern Asia: the Tanguts of the Xi Xia dynasty, the Khitans of the Liao dynasty, and the Jurchens of the Jin dynasty.  [...] As Paul Jakov Smith writes, ‘The rapid evolution of Inner Asian statecraft in the tenth to thirteenth centuries allowed states on the northern frontier to support formidable armies that offset agrarian China’s advantages in wealth and numbers, hereby blocking [the] Song from assuming a position of supremacy at the center of a China-dominated world order and relegating it to a position of equal participant in a multi-state East Asian system.’

Tonio Andrade, The Gunpowder Age: China, Military Innovation, and the Rise of the West in World History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 25-26. 

5. All the section titles are idioms, famous quotes, sayings, or excerpts from classical Chinese literature. 

The stanza, “When blessed by all the gifts of nature, one's every measurement conforms to its standard / As perfect as the roundness of the moon” is excerpted from Book II of “Poetry and Discourse from North of the River” [北江诗话] by Hong Liangji [洪亮吉]  (1746-1809).  

6. This quote is taken from Fareed Zakaria’s 2008 article in Foreign Affairs, “The Future of American Power.” See Fareed Zakaria, “The Future of American Power: How America Can Survive the Rise of the Rest,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 3 (2008): 18–43.

7. The Chinese is not an exact quote of Brzezinski's. The closest line to this quotation in The Grand Chessboard is the following: “The defeat and collapse of the Soviet Union was the final step in the rapid ascendance of a Western Hemisphere power, the United States, as the sole and, indeed, the first truly global power.” See Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books, 1997), xii. 

8. The author are likely paraphrasing the following section from L. S. Stavrianos’ A Global History: From Prehistory to the 21st Century: “China, by contrast, was unable to reorganize itself to meet the Western challenge. Yet, being too large and cohesive to be conquered outright like India and the other countries of Southeast Asia, China was never to succumb entirely." The argument that China's size allowed it to assimilate invaders is not found in Stavrianos' bok. L. S. Stavrianos, A Global History: From Prehistory to the 21st Century (New York: Pearson, 1998). 

9. Goldmsn Sachs still stands by this prediction. See Goldman Sachs, “How India Could Rise to the World’s Second Biggest Economy,” 6 July 2023. 

10. Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World (New York: WW Norton, 2008), 132.  

11. The idiom “[close] neighbors are dearer than distant relatives” originates from Book IV of Yuan Dynasty play Dong Tang Lao [东堂老], authored by Qin Jianfu [秦简夫]. 

12. CST editors could not locate the original source of this quotation. But the same view is a commonplace in Chinese international relations scholarship. For example, see Yan Xuetong, “Diplomacy Should Focus on Neighbors,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 27, 2015. 

13. Peter Frankopan, The Silk Roads: A New History of the World (New York: Bloomsbury, 2015), xiv.

14. This quotation from Eric Jones’ 1981 book The European Miracle has been modified to better fit within the text, but th description of the Muslim world as "asbestos"perhaps only make sense with a much larger excerpt:.

Nothing is clearer than that the fires of modernisation and industrialisation in Britain and Belgium and the Rhineland, quickly burned to the fringes of this European system. Even Russia and the Christian colonies of the Ottoman empire smouldered. But at the asbestos edge of the Muslim sphere the fires abruptly died. They never took light over most of the non-European world, Europe’s overseas annexes excepted.

See Eric Jones, Environments, Economies and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia (London: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 

15. In the Japanese context, “脱亚入欧”—abandon Asia, learn from Europe—is a Meiji era slogan associated with the famous Japanese political theorist Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901). The phrase first appeared in an anonymous 1885 editorial for the Jiji Shimpo likely written by Fukuzawa.  It advocated that Japan to distance itself from its Asian neighbors and to adopt European political, economic, and cultural models instead. It stemmed from the perception that Europe represented modernity, progress, and power, while Asia was seen as backward and inferior.

16. Dambisa Moyo, Edge of Chaos: Why Democracy Is Failing to Deliver Economic Growth—and How to Fix It (New York: Basic Books, 2018), ch. 2.

17. The subtitle 国向工则日新日智—A state that esteems industry will increase in wisdom day by day—is taken from Kang Youwei’s 1989 petition to the Qing emperor arguing that the dynasy should establish an award for industrial innovation. The complete couplet is: 国尚农，则守旧日愚；国尚工，则日新日智 [If a country esteems agriculture, it will remain conservative and ignorant day by day; if a country esteems industry, it will progress daily with new knowledge and wisdom].  

18. The idiom 一穷二白 [yī qióng èr bái] is used to describe a person or family in a state of extreme poverty, lacking all possessions and resources necessary for sustenance or improvement of life.

19. The Two Centenary Goals refer to two significant milestones set by the CPC to guide the country's development and to celebrate two important anniversaries. The first centenary goal was to mark the 100th anniversary of the founding of the CPC in 2021 by achieving a MODERATELY PROSPEROUS SOCIETY in all respects [全面建成小康社会]. The second centenary goal is to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China in 2049 by building China into a modern, socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious, and beautiful [富强、民主、文明、和谐、美丽的社会主义现代化国家].

20. See Xi Jinping 习近平, “Zai Qingzhu Gaige Kaifang 40 Zhounian Dahui Shang De Jianghua 在庆祝改革开放40周年大会上的讲话 [Speech at the 40th Anniversary Celebration of Reform and Opening-Up Conference],” Xinhua Wang 新华网 [Xinhua Online], 18 December 2018. 

21. The Great Leap Forward, a Maoist social and economic campaign that lasted from 1958 to 1962, attempted to take China from "feudalism" to "socialism" without (as Marxist theory would predict) any intervening period of capitalism in between. The cash course industrialization program was funded through the requisition of all agricultural surplus. The resulting famine killed tens of millions of people. This event is sometimes glossed over in Chinese historiography as "three years of natural disasters." Frank assessments of the Great Leap Forward's true costs and consequences are not unknown, but few and far enough between that their presence in a document like this should not be taken for granted.

22. The authors of National Security and The Rise and Fall of Great Powers do not include citations for any of the economic statistics cited here, nor can these numbers be found in any of the works included in the bibliography.

23. Robert Solow was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 1987 for his contributions to the theory of long term economic growth as a function of capital accumulation, population growth, and productivity growth driven by changing technology.

24. See William H. McNeill, The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 417-456.

25. Zheng He was a Ming admiral and diplomat who commanded seven expeditionary treasure voyages to Southeast Asia, South Asia, West Asia, and East Africa from 1405 to 1433. The contrast between Zheg He's voyages, which did not lead to sustaied conact between the Chinese state and the places he visited, is often contratsted in global history textbooks wit the smaller but more commercialy successful voyages of the European Age of Discovery.

26. For an example of Pan Jiaofeng’s theory on techno–scientific revolution, see Pan Jiaofeng 潘教峰, “Zhongguo Jianshe Shijie Keji Zhongxin Yinglai Zhanlue Jiyu Qi 中国建设世界科技中心迎来战略机遇期 [China's construction of a Global Science and Technology Center Enters a Strategic Opportunity Period],” CNICN, Feb 2019.

In it, he argues that the current incubation period of a new technological revolution  presents a strategic opportunity for China to establish itself as a global technological center. He argues that China, as a latecomer in technological innovation, must adopt a global perspective, engage in forward-looking research, and strategically position itself to achieve significant advancements in technological innovation and become a world technology center.

27. CST editors are unable to locate the original quote. For an example of Wen Yi’s argument, see Wen Yi, “The Making of an Economic Superpower---Unlocking China’s Secret of Rapid Industrialization,” Working Paper 2015-006B, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2015. In it, Wen argues that China’s economic rise could not be adequately explained by neoclassical economic theory. Instead, he introduces what he calls the “new stage theory” that emphasizes the role of the state’s economic policy in facilitating industrialization and industrial upgrading. 

28. Vaclav Smil, Made in the USA: The Rise and Retreat of American Manufacturing (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2015), 23. 

29. Slater's adaptation of the spinning jenny in 1789 is an early example of industrial espionage一and by extension, an American precedent for the widespread IP theft hat powered China's own rise.

30. The “Two Bombs, One Satellite” project refers to China's efforts in the mid-20th century to develop nuclear bombs, hydrogen bombs, and artificial satellites. 

31. Edward T. Johnson and Max von Zedtwitz, Created in China: How China is Becoming a Global Innovator (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 9.

32. 沧海横流显砥柱—rough seas reveal the strength of the mast—is a Chinese idiom that metaphorically describes a situation where the true essence of a person becomes clear only amidst great turmoil and diversity. It usually appears as a couplet, 沧海横流显砥柱，万山磅礴看主峰, which can be literally translated as “amidst the tumultuous sea, the mast stands firm; in the vast expanse of mountains, the main peak towers above.” The couplet does not originate from a single author. The preceding line is from Guo Moruo [郭沫若]'s “Man Jiang Hong” [满江红], and the following line is from Qing Dynasty Zeng Guofan [曾国藩]’s "Letter to the Former Chen Yu Ming” [复陈右铭太守书]. 

33. See Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 35. 

34. Elhanan Helpman, The Mystery of Economic Growth (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2010).

35. This passage is a combination of two quotes from Dambisa Moyo’s Edge of Chaos. The first can be found on page 54 and the second can be found on page 49.  

36. This passage is quoted from page 95 of Fareed Zakaria’s The Post-American World, but the CICIR researchers–or the translator of a Chinese version of the book–interpret it in a way that subverts Zakaria's original meaning. Zakariaargues that public support does not matter to the Chinese government, not that the Chinese government enjoys such support: “It is awkward to point out, but unavoidable: not having to respond to the public has often helped Beijing carry out its strategy.” Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008), 95.

37. While this is not presented as a direct quote, it resembles a line from the book: “The contemporary world has no example of a closed economy, tied by protectionist practices, which would be able to grow fast over the long term.” Grzegorz W. Kolodko, Whither the World: The Political Economy of the Future Volume 1 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 91. 

38. Xi Jinping, “Juesheng Quan Mianjian Cheng Xiaokang Shehui Duoqu Xin Shidai Zhongguo Tese Shehuizhuyi Weida Shengli Zai Zhongguo Gongchandang Di Shijiu Ci Quan Guo Daibiao Dahui Shang de Baogao 决胜全面建成小康社会 夺取新时代中国特色社会主义伟大胜利——在中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会上的报告 [Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in an All-round Way and Winning the Great Victory of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in the New Era——Report at the Nineteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China],” Xinhua, 27 October 2017.

39. Xi Jinping 习近平, “Zai Pudong Kaifang 30 Zhounian Qingzhu Dahui Shang de Jianghua 在浦东开发开放30周年庆祝大会上的讲话 [Speech at the Celebration Conference of the 30th Anniversary of the Development and Opening of Pudong] ,” Xinhua 新华, 12 November 2020. 

40. CST editors could not locate this exact quotation in Chua's work, but the final chapter of Amy Chua's Day of Empire advances a similar argument. Amy Chua, Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance—and Why They Fall (New York: Anchor Books, 2009), 318-343.

41. Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World, 211-212.  

42. See the CST glossary entry LEADERSHIP CORE for the meaning of this term. This entire section is a long and transparent justification for the centralization of power under Xi Jinping.  

43. Frederick Engels, "On Authority," Marxists Internet Archive, (or. pub 1872). 

44. The phrase “cobweb model” doe not have an established meanig in contemporary interntional relations; most often the phrase “cobweb model” is used in reference to an economic theory used to analyze supply and demand in markets characterized by time lags and adjustments.  

45. This is a major theme of Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn: Yale Univresity Press, 1968). 

46. CST editors could not locate Lin's original article. 

47.  The term "Bismark trap" is not a well established concept in either western or Chinese scholarship. CST editors were unable to find any mention of it outside of this passage.

48. Debate over the cause of the USSR’s fall has been wide ranging in Chinese academia, with critics of the official position pointing to the systemic decay of the Soviet economy or the failure of the USSR to reform the inflexible and rigid political structure it inherited from Stalin. For examples of critical arguments, see Wang Xiaoxiao 王笑笑, “Sulian Jubiande Genben Yuanyin 苏东剧变的根本原因 [The Fundamental Reason for the Transformation of theSoviet Union]” Aisixiang 爱思想, 4 March 2013; Huang Lifu 黄立茀, “Sulian Yinhe Sangshi Gaige Liangji  苏联因何丧失改革良机? Why did the USSR miss the chanceto reform?” Aisixiang 爱思想, 15 October 2009; Liu Xingyi 刘新宜, “Sugong Kuatai, Sulian Wangguode Yuanyin  苏共垮台、苏联亡国的原因 [Reasons for the Collapse of the Soviet Communist Party and the Demise of the USSR]” Aisixiang 爱思想, 14 November 2004. For longer presentations of the official view published around the same time as Liu’sarticle, see  Cheng Zhihua 陈之骅, “Lishi Xuwuzhuyi Gaoluan Sulian 历史虚无主义搞乱苏联 [Historical Nihilism Ruined the Soviet Union],” Aisixiang 爱思想, 18 September 2013 and Wang Tingyou 汪亭友, “Liang Zhong Duiweide Shijieguan he Lichang Guanchuan SulianYanbian Yanjiu 两种对立的世界观和立场贯穿苏联演变研究 [The Ideological Divide in the Study of the Soviet Collapse],”Aisixiang, 20 Feb 2014.

49. It is unclear when Deng Xiaoping said those words, but they are frequently referenced by party leaders. See Jiang Zemin 江泽民, “Jiang Zemin Zai Mao Zedong Tongzhi Danchen Yibai Zhounian Jinian Dahui Shang De Jianghua. 江泽民在毛泽东同志诞辰一百周年纪念大会上的讲话 [Jiang Zemin's Speech at the Commemoration Ceremony of the 100th Anniversary of Comrade Mao Zedong's Birth], Xinhua, 27 November 2009. 

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